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 In the face of growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the 
International Criminal Court, the four former Presidents of the ICC 
Assembly of States Parties published an open letter in April 2019 
calling for an “independent assessment of the Court’s functioning by a 
small group of international experts.”2 The stated goal is to use the 
assessment to help close the “growing gap between the unique vision 
captured by the Rome Statute . . . and some of the daily work of the 
Court.”3  
The letter is eloquent and worth reading in full. Among other 
things, the four Presidents state-- 
We have all committed ourselves to the ICC, driven by a belief 
in the central role of accountability for the most serious crimes of 
international concern and the conviction that the ICC offers a 
unique opportunity to fill the impunity gap. 
 
1. Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington University Law School. 
Formerly Ambassador and Special Coordinator for Global Criminal 
Justice, United States Department of State; and Assistant Legal Adviser 
for United Nations Affairs and Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-
Military Affairs, United States Department of State. This essay is adopted 
from a presentation prepared for the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center Conference. “Law and Atrocity Prevention,” at Case Western 
University School of Law on September 20, 2019. 
2. Prince Zeid Raad Al Hussein, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Christian Wenaweser 
& Tiina Intelmann, The International Criminal Court Needs Fixing, 
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We have never needed the Court more than today.  At a time of 
erosion of the rule of law, attempts to undermine the international 
order, and challenges to multilateral solutions when it is clear 
that other approaches fail, an effective ICC is more important 
than ever. From Syria to Myanmar, from Yemen to South Sudan, 
we are witnessing conflicts fought with cynical disregard for 
human dignity and international law. This has devastating 
consequences for the prospects of sustainable peace. 
The sheer existence of the ICC has had a strong positive impact 
. . . . Perpetrators all around the globe have been put on notice 
that they may face justice, sooner or later. Public calls for 
accountability, with the ICC as its beacon, have enabled 
important innovation, such as the accountability mechanisms for 
Syria and Myanmar, where the Court’s reach did not extend. 
Victims around the world, sadly millions of them, look to the 
Court as their best, and often only, hope.4 
A review has begun. The Secretariat of the Assembly of States 
Parties produced an extensive matrix of issues – under the heading 
“Meeting the challenges of today for a stronger Court tomorrow” -- as 
a basis for discussions.5 It attempts to break down the many issues into 
workable topics, and to identify ways to address them.6 Much work 
remains to be done but the openness to identifying and addressing 
problems is to be commended. 
The review is focused on improving the workings of the Court from 
a technical perspective.  This is reflected in the wording of the letter 
itself, which notes the exasperation of the authors with “the 
management deficiencies that prevent the Court from living up to its 
full potential,” and the Terms of Reference for the review, which 
specifically provide that the experts shall fulfill their mandate through 
a “review of a technical nature of processes, procedures, practice, and 
the organization of and framework for the Court’s operations.”7  The 
fact that the call is for a review of the Court’s functioning by 
independent “experts” further underscores the contemplated “technical 
nature” of the undertaking. 
 
4. Id. 
5.    See ASP Bureau, Draft Working Paper Meeting the challenges of today 
for a stronger Court tomorrow Matrix over possible areas of strengthening 




7. ICC-ASP/18/Res.7, Review of the International Criminal Court and the 
Rome Statute System, Annex I (Dec. 6, 2019), https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP18/ICC-ASP-18-Res7-ENG-ICC-Review-
resolution-17Dec19-1530.cln.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q67A-8ZE2].  
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The desire for such a review is not surprising. The Court’s 
performance has disappointed even staunch supporters. There are 
widespread perceptions that the Prosecutor and the judges have worked 
at cross-purposes, that there is dissension and dissatisfaction among the 
judges themselves, and that many of the public wounds suffered by the 
Court have been self-inflicted.8  
The first section below briefly recalls some of the events that have 
fed these perceptions, and how they fit into the present calls for review. 
These are the kinds of missteps that the present review appears intent 
on addressing, with an objective of eliminating or at least minimizing 
similar missteps in the future. 
But the Court faces an even more formidable set of challenges that 
go to the heart of what the Court is about.  This set of challenges traces 
back to the fundamental mismatch between expectations about what 
the Court will take on and outcomes that an institution such as the 
Court – no matter how brilliantly its technical problems might be 
addressed – can realistically be expected to accomplish. These entail 
not just technical questions for review by technical experts, but 
fundamentally political questions about what the Court should consider 
to be within its mandate.  One can sense -- in the letter, in the matrix 
produced by the Secretariat, and in conversations with those involved 
-- a desire to steer the exercise away from such questions, including in 
statements that suggest that the ambit of this exercise does not include 
“many issues [that] are within the remit of the Court itself to address 
as a matter of prosecutorial and judicial independence and 
administrative discretion.”9  But whether as part of this review or 
otherwise, these issues about how the provisions governing the 
jurisdiction of the Court should be interpreted and applied must be 
successfully addressed if the Court is to be sustainable.  
1. Missteps that have Marred the Headlines 
The recitation of problems facing the Court begins with the paucity 
of convictions.  Even with the conviction of Bosco Ntaganda10 in July 
2019, in the now more than twenty years since the Rome Conference, 
and the more than seventeen years since the Rome Statute entered into 
force, there stand only four convictions for the crimes – genocide, crimes 
 
8. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Part II- This is not Fine: The International 
Criminal Court in Trouble, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-ii-this-is-not-fine-the-international-
criminal-court-in-trouble/ [https://perma.cc/PA3H-LE7U].  
9. ASP Bureau, Draft Non-Paper: Meeting the challenges of today for a 
stronger Court tomorrow, Introductory Note (15 July 2019). 
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against humanity and war crimes – for which the drafters of the Rome 
Statute said they were acting to end impunity.11  To be sure, we should 
be careful not to equate the fact of acquittals with the failure of criminal 
justice.  At the same time, events like the reversal and acquittal by an 
ICC Appeals Chamber in June 2018 in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba12 
– ten years after his arrest and transfer to The Hague, and the 
expenditure of untold resources consumed in the investigation of the 
situation -- was a stunning blow to observers of the Court, and an even 
more stunning blow to the victims of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, including widespread sexual violence, in the Central African 
Republic that no one denies were committed.13 Similarly stunning was 
the acquittal of former Côte d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé, who had served as a Minister in Gbagbo’s 
government, on the basis of a “No Case to Answer” motion.  Several 
years following the arrest of and transfer of the defendants to the 
Hague, and once again following the expenditure of untold ICC 
resources, ICC judges concluded that, even without rebuttal, the 
evidence that the Prosecutor had put forward did not provide a 
reasonable basis for a finding that the defendants were guilty – in the 
words of the Court, there was “no need for the defence to submit further 
evidence as the Prosecutor has not satisfied the burden of proof.”14  The 
 
11. Id.; Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction (Dec. 1, 
2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2014_09844.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/3TN9-UR2Z]; Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-
01/07, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/322X-VTPV]; Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-
01/15, Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF [https://perma.cc/W7JC-
45ZJ]. It is worth noting that one of the four convictions was the result 
of a guilty plea, not a trial, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, 
Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016), and also worth noting that there 
have been additional convictions for charges relating to the administration 
of justice under Article 70 of the Rome Statute, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute], as opposed to the underlying atrocity crimes 
as defined under Article 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. 
12. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Judgment on the Appeal (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_02984.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/PPP3-Q8E4]. 
13. See, e.g., Oumar Ba, What Jean-Pierre Bemba’s acquittal by the ICC 




14. Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, ICC-02/11-01/15, 
Reasons for oral decision on 15 January 2019 (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/440017/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/N753-
J9VN]. The arrest warrants against both men had been issued in late 
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collapse of the cases against President Kenyatta and Vice President 
Ruto of Kenya were similarly dispiriting for observers and victims, and 
the widespread belief that the  defendants were responsible for witness 
tampering that had led to the result did little to stem the erosion of 
confidence in the Court as an institution upon which the international 
community could count for providing justice. 
There has been a litany of other problems as well, including 
criticism of remarks made by one of the ICC judges, Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut, about some of the inner workings of the ICC and the 
attitude of some of the judges;15 the circumstances surrounding the 
acceptance of the resignation of one of the judges in an ongoing case to 
allow her to assume a diplomatic post, notwithstanding the risk to the 
Court’s ability to continue its work to render a final verdict;16 the 
submission of a lawsuit by several of the ICC judges arguing that they 
are being underpaid;17 and widespread reports of the lack of collegiality 
among the judges generally.18   
It is not my point here to condemn the Court for these events – 
indeed, in each case there is another side to the story that needs to be 
considered – but simply to note the adverse effect such events have had 
on the overall level of confidence in the ability of the Court to navigate 
successfully in the very complicated world in which it must operate.  
2. Problems of a More Conceptual Nature 
Underneath the problems described above is the mismatch between 
expectations about the Court’s “promises” and its capabilities to deliver 
justice.  The mismatch is the source of disappointment from 
constituencies whose support should be the life-blood of the Court. This 
 
2011, and they had been transferred to The Hague in November 2011 and 
March 2014, respectively. The Court had decided to join the two cases in 
March 2015, and the trials had opened in January 2016. 
15. Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Transcription écrite de l’intervention de 
Monsieur le Juge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut à la Peking University Law 
School (Beijing) du 17 Mai 2017, ICC-01/04-01/06-3451-Anx1, Lecture 
Transcript (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2019_02039.PDF [https://perma.cc/ME5U-
W7KC].  
16. Tjitske Lingsma, ICC Judges at Centre of Controversy, JUSTICEINFO.NET 
(May 16, 2019), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41447-icc-
judges-at-centre-of-controversy.html [https://perma.cc/ZN7D-AV79]. 
17. Marlise Simons, In The Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges Wrangle 
Over Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/europe/hague-judges-
pay.html [https://perma.cc/66FY-WLHK]. 
18. Hemi Mistry, The Significance of Institutional Culture in Enhancing the 
Validity of the International Criminal Court, 17 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 703 
(2017). 
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includes disappointment among victims, who feel their hopes for justice 
being abandoned; disappointment among justice advocates, who tire of 
feeling the need to apologize for the shortfall; and the disempowerment 
of those within states who would otherwise be expected to champion 
the Court’s cause within governments, with the inevitable result that 
support for the Court takes on a lower priority in the diplomatic and 
political agenda of those states. Whatever course the Court charts, it 
needs to take head-on the problem that the promise that the ICC is 
perceived to have made – that the crimes with which it deals are of a 
kind that “must not go unpunished”19 -- is not achievable if the Court 
remains on its present course.  
But it is easier to describe the mismatch between expectations and 
capabilities than to agree on ways to deal with it. The sources of the 
“over-bite” – the difference between what the Court promises and what 
it can realistically be expected to deliver -- are deeply ingrained. They 
grow largely out of the inability of the Court to more aggressively filter 
those situations and cases in which it should play a role, and those in 
which it should not. That inability springs not from the Rome Statute 
as such, but from the ways in which Court actors have chosen to 
interpret and apply it, and the meaning they have ascribed to the 
notion that the ICC is a court of last resort. These are not simply 
technical questions, inevitably to be decided upon by technical experts, 
but fundamentally political issues that states must decide to resolve for 
themselves or live with the consequences of leaving them to experts for 
resolution. 
Within the Rome Statute, the main burden of ensuring the 
necessary filtering of situations and cases was intended to be borne by 
the Statute’s provisions on admissibility.20 But twenty years of 
experience have demonstrated that the treaty left much to be worked 
out. Its provisions on complementarity, gravity and interests of justice 
all speak to critical elements of how Court actors should go about 
filtering, and how they should go about allocating the Court’s resources, 
but they do so with imprecision.   
It has thus in practice been left for Court actors to elaborate the 
rules.  In important ways they have done so in a manner that errs on 
the side of broader jurisdiction and thereby serves to minimize the 
amount of filtering. The result of the filters doing too little filtering has 
effectively meant that too many situations have been deemed to fall 
within the Court’s mandate. Implicitly this represents a decision that 
the burden of filtering will instead need to be based upon the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion: judgments by the Prosecutor about how to 
choose among the too-many situations and cases that have been deemed 
to fit within the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction.  The fact that the 
 
19. Rome Statute, supra note 11, preamble. 
20. Id. art. 17, 53.  
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high number of situations and cases outstrips the Court’s resources 
means that the Prosecutor is left having to triage decisions on 
purportedly objective, but self-evidently practical and political, bases.21  
But this itself runs into a problem created by the mood of our times, 
in which states are not particularly willing to trust in the discretion of 
an independent international prosecutor to make judgments that are 
essentially of such a political nature. 
Some specific examples may help illustrate the point. 
A. Gravity.   
Under Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible 
– in other words, the Court cannot proceed to exercise jurisdiction over 
it – if it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the 
Court.”22  On its face, the language does not specify what level of 
gravity would be “sufficient”.  
As this is being sent to publication, there are twelve states in which 
the Court has ongoing situations under investigation,23 and another 
eight situations that the Prosecutor has reported are under preliminary 
examination.24  Thus, out of slightly more than 120 states that have 
become parties to the Rome Statute, approximately one out of every 
six is currently subject to the Court’s scrutiny, and this is in addition 
to a number of other states that are aware or suspect the Prosecutor is 
reviewing them in a “pre-Preliminary Examination” phase. This seems 
a far cry from the notions that many supporters put forward about how 
the Court would operate in the period when it was taking root.  For 
example, the Court’s first President, Philippe Kirsch – speaking as part 
of an effort to assuage anxieties of the United States about the Court 
and the prospect of it coming after American servicemen – famously 
said that is not what this Court is about, and that it was rather 
designed to go after big-fish perpetrators of atrocities like Saddam 
 
21. See William Schabas, “Feeding Time at the Office of the Prosecutor, INT’L 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE TODAY (Nov. 13, 2016), https://www.international-
criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/icc-prosecutors-perpetuation-of-the-
fiction-of-objectivity/ [https://perma.cc/PUU2-VPW6]. 
22. Id. art. 17(1)(d). 
23. They are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan 
(Darfur), Central African Republic (two separate investigations), Kenya, 
Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Georgia, Burundi, Bangladesh/Myanmar and 
Afghanistan. See ICC Prosecutor, Situations Under Investigation, INT’L 
CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situation.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/5J4H-EHED]. 
24. The eight are the situations in The Philippines, Ukraine, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Guinea, Iraq/UK, Nigeria, and Palestine. See Report on 
Preliminary Examination Activities 2019, INT’L CRIM. CT.: THE OFF. OF 
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Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic – truly the worst-of-the-worst.25  It is 
also in at least potential tension with the notion that the crimes that 
the Court should pursue are those that the international community 
truly considers “must not go unpunished.”26 A better match between 
the crimes for which the international community considers within the 
ICC’s responsibility and those that it genuinely considers “must not go 
unpunished” would do much to cushion the ICC against allegations of 
over-reach.  An obvious way for the Court to narrow its focus would 
be to use a higher threshold in determining whether a case or situation 
is sufficiently grave.  If the Court’s responsibility should be for “the 
worst-of-the-worst,” use of a higher gravity threshold could help 
accomplish that.   
That said, for its part, the Court has made the not-unreasonable 
point that the exclusion of perpetrators from the ambit of the Court 
“could severely hamper the preventive, or deterrent, role of the Court 
which is a cornerstone of [its] creation, by announcing that any 
perpetrators other than those at the very top are automatically 
excluded from the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.”27 Thus, there 
is a dilemma. On the one hand it may seem obvious that the gravity 
threshold needs to be raised if the Court is to limit the prospect of it 
being responsible for promises to deliver justice that it will never be 
able to fulfill, while on the other hand there is a risk that raising the 
threshold may undermine the Court’s value to prevent or deter future 
crimes. 
In addition to questions about the “amount” of gravity that should 
be required before the Court can exercise jurisdiction, there are related 
questions about the nature of the metric. For example, one possible 
metric turns on endemic factors such as the number of victims, the 
cruelty with which the crimes were committed, and the extent to which 
they were undertaken in a systematic fashion.  Another possible metric, 
however, gives greater weight to external factors, such as the signal 
that investigation of a situation or the prosecution of a case would send 
that no person stands above justice, on the theory such an approach 
will increase the deterrent value of the Court’s work.  From the 
perspective of a large power, however, the prospect of such an approach 
inevitably raises alarm bells. What better way, such a power might fear, 
for the Prosecutor and the Court to establish that no one is above the 
 
25. Siddharth Varadarajan, Living up to the Legacy of Nuremberg: Interview 
with International Criminal Court (ICC) President Philippe Kirsch, 
GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 13, 2005), https://www.globalresearch.ca/living-up-
to-the-legacy-of-nuremberg/1479 [https://perma.cc/3J34-UG42].  
26. Rome Statute, supra note 11, preamble.  
27. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04-
169, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for 
Warrants of Arrest, Article 58,” ¶ 75 (Jul. 13, 2006), http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/8c20eb/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/NW52-RFYY]. 
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law than to prioritize cases against its leaders and personnel. There is 
thus again a dilemma, as an approach that is based on the signaling 
effect may on the one hand enhance deterrence but on the other hand 
make enemies out of large states that fear being unfairly targeted, and 
in the process deprive the Court of support that it ultimately needs in 
order to be successful.  
On each of these questions, the words of the Rome Statute, and 
even the travaux préparatoires, do not provide clear guidance. It is as 
if, in agreeing to the Rome Statute, the states delegated to the Court’s 
actors the task of figuring out what the gravity standard actually 
meant. Things have changed since 1998, however, and states appear to 
have less appetite for delegations of this type of authority, and less 
willingness to simply accept whatever answers the Court works out.  A 
question for the Court – indeed, one of its important challenges – is 
whether and how it should account for this as it interprets and applies 
these provisions going forward.  
B. Interests of Justice.   
Article 53 of the Rome Statute provides that, in her decisions 
whether to commence an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider 
whether there are “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice.”28  As with gravity, there was 
no real agreement at Rome on what the phrase “interests of justice” 
was intended to encompass.29  Might the interests of a state and its 
people in promoting peace and reconciliation outweigh its interests -- 
and those of the international community -- in a more standard brand 
of criminal accountability?  Should the ICC Prosecutor and the Court 
defer to a decision within a society to pursue such alternatives and, if 
so, under what conditions?  
Indeed, in the years after Rome, there was a healthy literature 
regarding how the phrase “interests of justice” should be interpreted. 
The argument was sometimes framed around the then-recent experience 
of South Africa following the dark days of apartheid, and the use of 
truth and reconciliation commissions as an alternative to traditional 
notions of criminal accountability as a way to come to terms with the 
past.30  Thus, some wanted to exclude situations like those faced in 
South Africa in which there might be a need for political forbearance 
 
28. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1)(c) and art. 53(2)(c).  
29. See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, Justice Versus Peace, in THE UNITED STATES 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 179 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl 
Kaysen, eds., 2000) [hereinafter SCHARF]. 
30. See Martha Minow, Do Alternative Justice Mechanisms Deserve 
Recognition in International Criminal Law?: Truth Commissions, 
Amnesties, and Complementarity at the International Criminal Court, 60 
HARV. INT’L L. J. 1, 19 (2019).  
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in the interests of securing peace and reconciliation.  Others strongly 
opposed the codification of any such forbearance on the grounds that 
it would undermine the essential commitment that they believed states 
parties should make to the principle that atrocity crimes must not go 
unpunished in becoming parties to the Rome Statute, and because it 
was inconsistent with their view that it was neither appropriate nor 
effective to set aside criminal justice in favor of “peace.”31   
In the end, it was felt that “agreement would likely have been 
impossible, given the sharply clashing views on the matter.”32  The 
solution – credited to the chairman of the Rome Conference, Philippe 
Kirsch – was found in the deliberate ambiguity of the phrase “interests 
of justice,” with the parties essentially leaving it to the Prosecutor and 
the Court to figure it out for themselves.33  This remained a lively topic 
of debate when the Office of the Prosecutor released a strategy paper 
in 2007 that sharply curtailed -- and that might in fact be viewed as 
eliminating -- the prospect for the Prosecutor to defer to decisions to 
pursue paths that did not entail sufficient criminal accountability of a 
traditional nature.34 It was not denied that the Court’s activities might 
complicate ongoing peace efforts, but the argument was that this was 
an issue for other institutions to consider and address.35 Thus, in a 
situation that posed unacceptable risks for peace and reconciliation 
efforts, the United Nations Security Council might step in under Article 
16 of the Rome Statute by adopting a resolution under chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter to block an investigation or prosecution, 
but these type of considerations were not properly part of the 
calculations for Court actors in deciding whether to pursue 
investigations or prosecutions.36 
As with gravity, the issue presents dilemmas. On the one hand, 
making the Prosecutor and the Court responsible for decisions about 
ongoing peace negotiations would cast them in political roles for which 
they are ill-suited. What would be the source of legitimacy, skeptics 
 
31. See id. at 16, n.84.  
32. Darryl Robinson, Serving the Interests of Justice: Amnesties, Truth 
Commissions and the International Criminal Court, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
481, 483 (2003). 
33. Id. See also SCHARF, supra note 29, at 186 (“According to the chairman 
of the Rome Diplomatic Conference, Philippe Kirsch, the adopted 
provisions reflect ‘creative ambiguity’ that potentially could allow the 
ICC Prosecutor and Judges to interpret the Rome Statute as permitting 
recognition of an amnesty exception to the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
34. Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, INT’L CRIM. CT.: THE OFF. OF 
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would surely ask, for Court actors playing such a role? On the other 
hand, the resulting inability of the Court to filter cases better left to 
alternative outcomes risks contributing further to the “over-bite” that 
is in tension with the need for the Court to marshal its energy and 
resources on a narrower universe of cases and situations. 
C. Complementarity.  
Article 17 of the Rome Statute also addresses the concept of 
complementarity. The fundamental idea is that a case shall not be 
admissible where: 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
(b)  The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the 
person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is 
not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3 . . .  .37 
The wording of these provisions raises important questions of many 
different types. One illustrative question warranting mention here 
concerns treatment of cases where there is no investigation or 
prosecution. For example, should the fact that national authorities have 
not pursued a case mean automatically that the Court can exercise 
jurisdiction (as the Prosecutor has indicated is her view),38 or should it 
also be necessary to demonstrate that the reason they failed to pursue 
the case was to shield the accused?   
In practice, there may be any number of reasons that a state’s 
investigators or prosecutors might choose not to pursue particular 
cases, and those reasons are not all equally worthy of the Court’s 
intervention. For example, the desire of a domestic prosecutor not to 
pursue a case may result from tactical choices by the state’s Prosecutor, 
who must make choices about how to marshal her resources and energy 
(just as the ICC’s Prosecutor must make such choices); a well-founded 
 
37. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 17(1)(a)–(c).  
38. See Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, INT’L CRIM. CT.: THE 
OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR ¶ 47 (Nov. 2013), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-
Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA8S-UL5E] (“The absence of national proceedings, 
i.e. domestic inactivity, is sufficient to make the case admissible.”) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. 
ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga 
against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the 
Admissibility of the Case, ¶ 78 (Sept. 25, 2009), https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/ba82b5/pdf/ [perma.cc/C2RN-Y3KU]).  
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conclusion that the chances of securing a conviction are too remote, 
even where there is a view that the person may well have committed 
the offense; a general provision of law that has been put in place for 
reasons having nothing to do with any desire to shield those who are 
responsible for the particular crimes in question (for example, a rule 
blocking the use of hearsay evidence that would be necessary to secure 
a conviction); or a decision to prosecute those responsible for seemingly 
lesser but more readily provable crimes (like when the U.S. federal 
government prosecution of Al Capone for tax evasion).  
The decision not to prosecute may in fact be subject to, and even 
deserve, criticism.  Perhaps the domestic prosecutor is making the 
wrong tactical choice, or the Prosecutor should be willing to devote 
greater resources and energy to the case, or the rule that is blocking 
the Prosecutor from moving forward should be made inapplicable to 
the type of crimes in question, or the Prosecutor has given insufficient 
weight to the value of pursuing charges of Rome Statute as opposed to 
other, more seemingly “mundane” crimes. But the question whether the 
ICC should assert itself as the court of last resort is different than the 
question whether the prosecutor deserves criticism. In particular, in the 
absence of some demonstration that the domestic prosecutor in an 
otherwise well-functioning judicial system is “shielding” persons 
responsible for the crimes in question, the conclusion that the Court 
should intervene becomes less than obvious, and it sits in evident 
tension with the view that the underlying premise of the ICC’s 
complementarity regime was to ensure that the Court not interfere 
“except in the most obvious cases.”39 It may well be that the domestic 
Prosecutor’s decision to, for example, pursue “mundane” rather than 
Rome Statute charges is part of a broader effort to shield those accused 
of the crimes.  What is not obvious, however, is that this should be 
presumed, and that there should be no requirement to demonstrate the 
existence of such “shielding.”  Indeed, the ICC Prosecutor may herself 
make decisions of the type described above that result in not pursuing 
seemingly worthy cases, and such a failure to act can hardly be taken 
as a signal of bad-faith that warrants intervention by a higher-level 
court.40  
 
39. John Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in 3 THE 
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 675 (Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
40. There are of course related questions of burden of proof.  The case law 
has indicated that it is the state that bears the burden of establishing 
that the ICC should defer to the decisions of its prosecutors.  Such a rule 
reflects that the state will be better-positioned with evidence and 
information about the steps that it has taken, and that it is fair to draw 
inferences against states that elect not to provide evidence of their good 
faith to the ICC Prosecutor. But such a rule can easily be in tension with 
a presumption of deferral to the sovereign decisions of states. The burden 
of proof issue may be most relevant when it comes to assessing the 
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But the question whether there needs to be a demonstration of 
shielding with respect to cases that have not been pursued is a two-
edged sword. The need to demonstrate shielding would at once help 
ensure that the Court more narrowly focuses on the most egregious 
cases – cases in which the role of a court of last resort would appear 
most essential – while at the same time complicating the ability of the 
Prosecutor and the Court to proceed, rendering successful prosecutions 
dependent on demonstration of an element that may often be difficult 
to demonstrate. Thus, once again, it is simpler to recognize the problem 
than to fix it. 
3. Reflections 
As described above, much of the public debate about the need to 
reform the Court appears focused on addressing the kind of problems 
described in the first section of this reflection – the problems that I 
characterize above as having marred the headlines. These are widely 
conceived of as problems of execution, with the ICC being an institution 
with a fundamentally sound mandate but that is being let down by 
sub-standard performance of Court actors. 
 
behavior of non-state parties. States that have become parties to the 
Rome Statute have chosen to undertake an obligation to provide relevant 
information to the Prosecutor and the Court. In the course of this 
undertaking, they have presumably taken whatever steps are necessary 
under their domestic law to provide relevant information. Non-state 
parties are situated differently: it is not as self-evidently fair to draw 
adverse inferences where they in fact have no obligations to supply 
information, and non-parties may well face impediments under domestic 
law to sharing information about their criminal investigations and 
prosecutions based on domestic law restrictions that have nothing to do 
with the ICC. 
 To its credit, the Office of the Prosecutor has developed a robust list of 
considerations that would be relevant to a determination whether 
shielding has occurred. For example, in her words-- 
 “Intent to shield a person from criminal responsibility may be assessed in 
light of such indicators as, manifestly insufficient steps in the investigation 
or prosecution; deviations from established practices and procedures; 
ignoring evidence or giving it insufficient weight; intimidation of victims, 
witnesses or judicial personnel; irreconcilability of findings with evidence 
tendered; manifest inadequacies in charging and modes of liability in 
relation to the gravity of the alleged conduct and the purported role of 
the accused; mistaken judicial findings arising from mistaken 
identification, flawed forensic examination, failures of disclosure, 
fabricated evidence, manipulated or coerced statements, and/or undue 
admission or non-admission of evidence; lack of resources allocated to the 
proceedings at hand as compared with overall capacities; and refusal to 
provide information or to cooperate with the ICC.” 
 Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, supra note 34. 
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But not all the problems are of a nature that can be addressed on 
a technical level. In this regard, the full transcript of Judge de 
Brichambaut’s remarks, noted above, includes insightful comments 
about the origin and nature of some of the problems that the ICC now 
faces.41 He recalls the very specific negotiating dynamic that existed at 
Rome – what he calls “the wave of convergence around a certain model 
of values” and the post-Cold War interest in multilateralism that had 
marked the 1990’s – and concludes, “It is quite improbable . . . that 
something like the Rome Statute could be adopted in the international 
context nowadays.”42 
The implications of this observation are significant. At its heart, 
the International Criminal Court is an international organization. Like 
any other international organization, its constituent document – the 
Rome Statute – was at its inception a work-in-progress.  Like 
constituent documents of other international organizations, it laid out 
basic principles designed to address core issues, knowing that experience 
and practice would inevitably bring to the surface additional issues that 
would need to be worked out. This was perhaps all the more so in the 
case of the Rome Statute because so much of the work that it would be 
called upon to perform was terra nova. Indeed, even in the immediate 
aftermath of Rome, recognition by the signatories of the need to fill in 
the gaps led to a whole series of negotiations and processes, including 
talks on such critical matters as the Rules of Procedure, the Elements 
of Crime, the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, and the crime 
of aggression. The work on such issues was impressive, and much of it 
was of a technical nature. But some of the work was not. Nevertheless, 
fortunately, there remained enough commonality of interest among the 
range of states involved that solutions could be devised even on issues 
having significant political components. 
The ICC is, by its nature, an institution that embodies lofty 
aspirations. It is directed, to transplant the words of Justice Jackson 
regarding Nuremberg and Nazi crimes, against wrongs “so malignant, 
and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, 
because it cannot survive their being repeated.”43 Yet experience and 
practice inevitably brings fissures to the surface.  The fact that certain 
key issues were deliberately resolved via “creative ambiguity” made it 
inevitable that cleavages would emerge once real world cases arose. 
What is the biggest set of challenges facing the ICC today? It may 
be that the most important issues confronting it are not simply 
questions of a technical nature, but rather are first-order political 
questions that were either left open or insufficiently recognized in what 
 
41. See de Brichambaut, supra note 15. 
42. Id. 
43. Robert Jackson, Opening Address, in 2 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 
NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945 – 1 OCTOBER 1946, 99 (1947). 
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now serves as the constituent document of the ICC. The biggest 
challenge facing the Court would appear to be the need to find 
sustainably acceptable approaches to essentially political questions that 
eluded states even in the relatively euphoric period in which the original 
Rome Statute was concluded. The need to do so now, in a period when 
political common ground is maddeningly elusive,  and in which there is 
a pervasive lack of confidence in the Court, means that it is far less 
likely for states simply to defer to responses that Court actors develop 
to meet these challenges. 
 
